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Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership
Abstract
This paper identifies the impact of borrowing constraints on homeownership in the U.S. in the aftermath
of the 2008 financial crisis. While homeownership declines and tightened credit are evident, the role the
tightening of credit has had on the probability of individual households to become homeowners has not
been previously identified. The homeownership rate in 2010-2013 is estimated to be 2.3 percentage
points lower than if the constraints were set at the 2001 level.
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Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership†
By Arthur Acolin, Jesse Bricker, Paul Calem, and Susan Wachter*
Borrowing constraints enable lenders to manage risk using non-price terms in the presence of
imperfect information but also impact the ability
of households to become homeowners. Some
individual households’ welfare would improve
if constraints were lifted. However, as the subprime crisis demonstrates, indiscriminately lifting borrowing constraints increases risk in the
mortgage market unsustainably and can entail
systemic risk.
The literature has identified three constraints
that limit access to mortgages: wealth (through
maximum loan to value ratio); income (through
maximum debt to income ratio); and credit
(through minimum credit score). Households
with insufficient wealth or income (relative to
their preferred housing consumption and local
house prices) or an inadequate credit score are
unable to become owners even if that would be
the optimal tenure based on their preferences,
expected duration of residence, and user cost of
owning relative to renting.
Changes in the mortgage market can lead to
relaxed borrowing constraints, expanded access
to mortgages, and increased homeownership.
Whether such credit expansions are sustained
depends on the ability of financial markets and

regulations to ensure proper risk management
and assessment.
The first section reviews evidence of the existence of credit rationing in the US mortgage
market. The second section discusses the impact
of borrowing constraints on homeownership
outcomes post World War II. The third section
presents new estimates of the effect of borrowing constraints in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis.
I. Credit Rationing and Homeownership

Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develop a model
in which lenders ration access to credit using
non-price terms. Lenders’ ability to risk-base
price is limited by the high transaction and
information costs associated with estimating
credit risk, the presence of unobservable characteristics that affect credit risk, and the effect
of higher interest rates on adverse selection and
moral hazard. The empirical literature provides
evidence of credit rationing in the mortgage
market (Duca and Rosenthal 1994). Lenders use
non-rate terms to limit adverse selection associated with higher interest rates or moral hazard
for borrowers with little collateral. In this context, borrowers who cannot meet a minimum
down payment requirement, for example, will
not be able to obtain a mortgage even if they are
willing to pay a higher interest rate.
Due to the reliance on access to credit to
purchase a home, the mortgage borrowing constraints that arise from credit rationing affect
households’ tenure (and the quantity of housing services they consume). Linneman and
Wachter (1989) show that wealth and income
constrained households have a lower propensity
to be homeowners.1
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1
Duca and Rosenthal (1994) and Rosenthal (2002) find
similar results, as does Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter
(1996) with wealth endogenized.
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The literature shows that young and minority
households are particularly impacted by borrowing constraints. Haurin, Hendershott, and
Wachter (1996) find that young households are
more likely to be constrained and that being
constrained has a large effect on the propensity
of a young household to own. Barakova et al.
(2003) look at recent movers under age 50 in
1989, 1995, and 1998 among households comprising the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of
Consumer Finances and estimate that homeownership would double from about 30 percent
to about 60 percent in that population if constraint removal were feasible. Examining differences across white and minority households,
Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter (1999) find
that minority households are both more likely
to be wealth constrained and less likely to be
homeowners when constrained. Their results do
not indicate significant differences across races
in the homeownership rate of unconstrained
households.
These studies were conducted in periods with
moderate house price appreciation, which would
tend to limit the binding impact of borrowing
constraints. Rapidly rising house prices contribute to increasing the demand for homeownership
due to backward looking higher expectations for
price appreciation (Case and Shiller 1989). With
rising house prices, constraints become more
binding increasing pressure to relax them; and
the level of constraints themselves may become
endogenous and 
procyclical, contributing to
financial instability.
II. Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership
Post-World War II

In the post-World War II period we have seen
three different mortgage lending regimes characterized by differing borrowing constraint conditions and homeownership outcomes. Borrowing
constraints can change as the result of regulatory
shifts or financial innovations or market pressures. The mechanism through which the loosening of constraints occurs has implications for
the sustainability of the expansion of credit and
homeownership access.
From 1940 to 1960, the US homeownership
rate increased by almost 20 percentage points,
from 44 percent to 62 percent (US Census
Bureau 2015). New government entities in the
mortgage market, established in the aftermath of
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the Great Depression, specifically FHA and the
secondary market institution Fannie Mae, along
with the economic expansion that followed
World War II, contributed to this rise. According
to Fetter (2013), the self-amortizing long-term
fixed rate mortgage with lower down payments,
introduced by FHA, was a major factor in this
rapid and large increase.
For the subsequent three decades of this postWorld War II regime, between the 1960s and
the 1990s, homeownership remained stable.
The conventional self-amortizing 30-year fixed
rate “American” mortgage (Green and Wachter
2005) provided housing finance, funded by
banks and S&Ls, through deposits, until the
1980s.2 In the aftermath of the S&L crisis, in
the 1980s and the 1990s, this instrument continued to prevail, funded by the secondary market.3 Despite substantial population growth and
increasing inflation over this period, housing
remained affordable due to this instrument, rising incomes, and an elastic housing supply.
Starting in the late 1990s, but accelerating
during the years 2003 to 2007, a combination
of regulatory shifts, changes to the structure of
the mortgage market, and rising house prices,
generated the second mortgage lending regime,
which would prove to be turbulent (McCoy,
Pavlov, and Wachter 2009). The expansion of
credit in the latter part of this period was quite
dramatic.4 The number of purchase mortgages
originated increased from 4.3 in 2001 to 5.7
million in 2004 and remained above 5.5 million
through 2006 (FFIEC 2015).
This increase in debt was not the result of
changes in underlying debt repayment capacity
of households (such as a positive shock to permanent income) but of changes in credit supply
(Levitin and Wachter 2012). During the same
2
In this period mortgages were effectively rationed.
Competition for deposits was limited due to Regulation Q
deposit rate ceilings. Similarly, deposit-taking institutions
did not compete for mortgage borrowers on rate.
3
Securitized mortgages through the GSEs funded the
long-term fixed rate mortgage after rising inflation decapitalized the S&Ls. The “housing finance revolution” ended
deposit regulation and linked housing finance markets to
credit markets (Green and Wachter 2005). The GSEs continued to impose credit constraints for “prime” mortgages that
they guaranteed (Levitin and Wachter 2012).
4
There is some evidence of the GSEs expanding credit
(Frame et al. 2015), while borrowing constraints remained
close to historical levels before the early 2000s (Rosenthal
2002).
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period, household debt increased faster than
income (Mian and Sufi 2015), driven by the
increasing volume and market share of nontraditional mortgages (NTM), subprime lending, and
second liens.
Gabriel and Rosenthal (2015) show that age
specific homeownership rates increased after
2000 beyond levels explainable by observables.
Barakova, Calem, and Wachter (2014) show
that, in the years 2003 to 2007, credit constraints
eased considerably relative to historic norms.
National homeownership rates peaked in 2004.
Despite the easing of lending constraints, rising
house prices increased the share of households
affected by constraints (Barakova, Calem, and
Wachter 2014).
Debates exist as to where credit was directed:
to minority and low-income households (Mian
and Sufi 2015); across the entire income spectrum (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 2015;
Acolin, An, Bostic, and Wachter 2015); or to
investors (Haughwout et al. 2011).
As the credit expansion took place, the
market share of subprime and NTM products
increased, but neither the risk characteristics
of the mortgages issued, nor how the risk was
priced, was known (Levitin and Wachter 2012).
In the aftermath, we now know that rising prices
and price expectations were associated with
increased NTM issuance (Brueckner, Calem,
and Nakamura 2012; Pavlov and Wachter 2011)
As house prices peaked in January 2006
and then rapidly declined, with subprime and
NTM issuance going near zero, over a third of
US homes with mortgages fell “underwater.”
Plummeting collateral values and a weakening
economy, combined with the risky characteristics of the loans originated during the boom
period, drove foreclosure rates to their highest
ever recorded levels. In response, a third regime
shift took place.
III. Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership
After the Great Recession

The homeownership rate declined from a
high of 69 percent in 2004 to 63.7 percent in
the third quarter of 2015 (US Census Bureau
2015).5 In response to high foreclosure rates
5
The decline in homeownership was particularly pronounced among 30 to 39-year-old household heads who
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and “
put-backs” to originators of defaulting
mortgages, lenders and secondary market institutions tightened the “credit box.” Evidence
on credit availability, based on the characteristics of borrowers, indicate tightening of mortgage underwriting over the period 2008–2013
beyond historic norms (Goodman, Zhu, and
George 2015). Nonetheless the impact of tightened credit on homeownership has not been
estimated.
We estimate the impact of borrowing constraints on homeownership after the Great
Recession using the Federal Reserve Survey of
Consumer Finance (SCF) for 2010 and 2013
and compare these estimates to those obtained
using previous (2001, 2004, and 2007) surveys
(Acolin, Bricker, Calem, and Wachter 2015).
The SCF has detailed information about household wealth and income and variables to impute
a credit score based on the model developed in
Barakova et al. (2003). In addition, with access
to local information it is possible to estimate
the (unconstrained) preferred house value for
a household, given their place of residence, to
identify constrained households.
We find that tightened borrowing constraints
have a substantial negative impact on the probability of becoming a homeowner in the aftermath
of the Great Recession. In the overall population,
the estimated marginal decline in the likelihood
of being an owner, associated with being subject to one or more of the three borrowing constraints (wealth, income, or credit), is 26 percent
in 2001 and 23 percent in the period 2004–2007.
Following the Great Recession (for the period
2010–2013), the marginal effect of being constrained is a 30 percent decrease in likelihood of
owning—substantially larger than in 2001 and
2004–2007 (Table 1).
Table 2 presents predictions of the homeownership rate in the overall population in
2010–2013 compared to 2 004  –2007, the loosened credit regime, and compared to 2001, the
historical credit regime. The homeownership
rate in 2010–2013 is 5.2 percentage points lower
experienced a 10.4 percentage point decline between 2004
and 2014 (from 61.9 to 51.5 percent) compared to a 4.6 percentage point decline in the overall population. The current
homeownership rate would be even lower without the aging
of the population. At 2004 age structure, the homeownership
in 2014 would be 62.8 percent instead of 64.5 percent (US
Census Bureau 2015).
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Table 1—Borrowing Constraints Marginal Effects on
Propensity to Own, Entire Population
2001

2004–2007 2010–2013

Borrowing constraint −0.26***
(0.02)
Individual and local
X
controls

−0.23*** −0.30***
(0.01)
(0.01)
X
X

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

2001 2004–2007 2010–2013
67.3%
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level.
IV. Conclusion

The rationing of credit in the mortgage market due to imperfect information impacts households’ propensity to own. In the 
post-World
War II era, institutional shifts and mortgage
product innovation increased access to mortgages and homeownership. In the decade 2000
to 2010, changes in the mortgage market led to
house price volatility, due to significant easing
and then tightening of the credit box, to levels
beyond historic norms and, ultimately to significant declines in homeownership rates.
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